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the individual spirit to project its own value and eternality beyond the limits of finite experience." Mysticism (*i. e.*, religion) is to be interpreted as a manifestation of practical activity. As such it can come into no collision with rationalism (*i. e.*, philosophical idealism).

Religion has had to sacrifice too much to win acquittal. To confine mysticism to conduct at the outset is to have rendered the aim of the discussion superfluous. Hegel's solution is far preferable; and it is better to leave a naked opposition than to reconcile religion and philosophy by multilating both.

Nevertheless, the attempt is interesting. The criticism of Bergson in the fifth essay is moderate and sound; but the book as a whole is disappointing. It was hardly to have been expected that articles and essays of this nature would have shown an entire unity of plan, but some of them are so trifling and so loosely connected with the argument that their inclusion is a serious blemish on a work, which by its title implies a good deal more than a collection of *disiecta membra*.

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PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES. By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. Pp. 75.

In this book Dr. Sanday continues discussions begun in another work called "Christologies Ancient and Modern." His object is to render the Incarnation intelligible to the modern mind, approaching it from the standpoint of psychology. His question is: How far does the present knowledge of the human mind enable us to understand the statement that Jesus Christ was very God and very man?

He thinks that the conception of the subliminal self,—on which some psychologists, notably the late F. W. H. Myers ("Human Personality") and Professor William James ("The Varieties of Religious Experience") have laid much emphasis,—throws some light on the question. It is held that the succession of conscious states is but a small part of our inner life. Below the threshold of distinct consciousness is a large reservoir in which are stored the results of past experiences. These states

are active and they continually influence one another; for principles, ideas, and emotions often return from the depths considerably modified. More: from this subliminal region there comes, sometimes at least, what did not enter through the senses or had its origin in reflection on the data supplied by them. This suggests that there is another entrance to the mind through which it comes into direct contact with an order of realities different from that accessible immediately or mediately to the senses. The reservoir is not, so to speak, closed at its lower end. It is fed from below. In the subliminal depths we come into relation with the Divine. The unconscious region or subliminal self is the proper and natural sphere of divine influence in the soul. Hence the method of Divine operation is hidden. A man prays; this is a direct and conscious act: the answer is not. "The man finds that he *has* what he wants, and what he has asked for; his strength *is* proportioned to his need; he *does* have joy and peace in believing. And he knows that this is due to no effort of his own, but to some subtle movement in the depths of his being" (p. 41). These secret workings come nearer the surface in some exceptional natures such as prophets and mystics; they have a more vivid experience of God than ordinary men, as we see by a reference to their writings and biographies.

Now Christ's inner life had this subliminal region, and his Deity had its 'seat' there. His consciousness was truly human in its operations, and the mode and region of the working of the Divine indwelling were not essentially different in Him from what they are in us, in so far as the Holy Spirit may be said to dwell in our hearts. "The difference was not in the essence, nor yet in the mode or sphere of the indwelling, but *in the relation of the indwelling to the Person.*" The Divine influences in us "touch more lightly or less lightly upon the Person, but they do not *hold and possess* it, as the Deity within Him *held and possessed* the Person of the incarnate Christ" (p. 48).

This interesting hypothesis suggests several questions, two of the more fundamental being the following: How is human personality to be conceived? And, What is the nature of the relation between the Divine and the human? Professor Sanday gives an answer to the first question. He does not, however, discuss the second; nor does he seem to have thought out his conception of personality in relation to it. The word person, he says, may denote the ground of individual being, or the total

self which includes the body, the vehicle of perception and motor activity and the medium of relation with other selves, or a smaller inner self. This last is the essential person. It is not compound, but simple, one and indivisible. Yet it is continuous with the whole. It represents the chief activities of the soul and dominates the others. Its function is to govern, control, unify. This self is (i) the centre or pivot or determining principle of unity; (ii) the thread of personal unity and identity; (iii) the vehicle of reflective consciousness; (iv) possesses the power of initiative; and has (v) the power of authoritative control.

It is questionable whether Dr. Sanday would find many psychologists to accept his description of the attributes of the ego. The attributes mentioned are too abstract and general to account for the concrete unity and organization characteristic of human experience, whether religious or non-religious. Some of them cannot be asserted except on general metaphysical grounds. Psychological data do not afford ground for saying that the small inner self is more simple and indivisible than the larger self with which it is in continuous active relation. And why should reflection be attributed to this self and perception denied it? Fundamentally, as Prof. Ward maintains ("Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. II, Part IV), the difference between perceiving and thinking is a difference of complexity. The subject of sense experience is one and continuous with the subject of knowledge. Again, the sense of continuity and identity depends, many psychologists believe, on the mass of vital sensations. Moreover,—and this objection is more serious for Dr. Sanday's theory,—his conception of self does not help us to understand the relation between the Divine and the human. The hypothesis of the subliminal self is independent of it. The two conceptions are merely brought together by the further hypothesis that the ego's life is largely subliminal. From the mystical point of view, —which seems to be the point of view from which Prof. Sanday approaches his problem,—it may be urged, on the one hand, that the ego is too large, and on the other, that it is too small; too large in that it leaves too solid a core of individuality to resist the union of the human consciousness with the Divine; and too small in view of the singular inclusiveness of the mystical consciousness. To meet the one objection, the individual core should be reduced to a point or mere centre. To meet the other

it should be expanded without limit. Stress should be laid either on the idea that everything the self knows is external to it; or on the idea that it includes all that it knows. If the latter idea be emphasized, it may be said that "in its widest possible sense a man's self is the sum total of all that he *can* call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and his children, his ancestors and his friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All these give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all" ("James, *Principle of Psychology*," I, pp. 291-2). Mystics sometimes identify themselves with the universe. They are conscious of oneness with God. The lowering of the threshold of consciousness may be the condition of the expansion of self so as to embrace the Divine. In harmony with this view stress should be laid on the intuitional rather than on the reflective powers of the self.

As already observed, Dr. Sanday does not discuss the nature of the relation between the Divine and the human. He uses the words '*Divine influence*,' '*Divine working*,' and speaks of the '*action* of the spirit of God upon the human spirit and faculties of apprehension.' Prof. Howison ("The Limits of Evolution") argues strongly that the influence of the Divine on the human can only be by illumination. The conception of efficient causality should be utterly repudiated in describing it. Prof. Ward, however, thinks ("The Realm of Ends") that we have a valid conception of Divine efficiency in the conception of creation,—a kind of efficient action which has nothing analogous to it in human experience. And the new man is conceived by St. Paul as the creation of God. But is this conception the right one to describe the communion of the human and the Divine in ourselves and in Christ? Communion between finite beings is mediated by knowledge. The knowing relation, Dr. Ward has pointed out, is ultimate and underivative. It cannot be expressed in terms of the lower category of causality. There are causal interactions within experience. But the primary and fundamental relation between the ego and what it knows is not causal. If, however, the relation between the Divine and the human is below the threshold of consciousness and the term

creation is inapplicable, are we not driven to employ the inferior category of causality to express it, or to leave it undefined, and so to find refuge for our perplexities in the unknown?

Professor Sanday has put forward his views in his usual cautious and tentative fashion. And he invites philosophical criticism. It is to be hoped that he will work out further his interesting and suggestive hypothesis.

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THE PROVINCE OF THE STATE. By Sir Roland K. Wilson, Bart.
London: P. S. King & Son, 1911. Pp. xxi, 321.

This is the best recent statement that I know of a point of view in political and social theory not very fashionable nowadays. In the running fight between the advocates, on the one hand, of various forms of State Socialism and the defenders, on the other, of private property and the liberty of the individual, the superiority, to judge from the noise made and the weight of metal thrown, to say nothing of actual legislation, has been all with the more advanced school. "These fight like husbands and live lovers those." But this book, with its plea for "the libertarian state, or state reduced to its lowest terms" has one great advantage over most works both of its own and of the opposite school. The author is a jurist rather than a philosopher, and his theory of the State is characteristic of the legal temperament at its best: it is clear and logical, everyone can understand it, and it seems to provide a definite rule for deciding what the State ought and ought not to do. For Burke the State is "a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection"; for the Neo-Hegelians (T. H. Green and Bosanquet) it is the organ of the 'real will' of its individual members (= their better selves); for Marxian socialists it is the sole rightful owner of property and of the instruments of production. All these conceptions are at once too vague and too ambitious for Sir Roland Wilson; the problem being at bottom always an ethical one,—to decide, namely, how coercion of the individual by government can be justified,—requires for its solution some less fantastic formula.

Sir Roland solves it by narrowing its basis. No one will deny that it is the business of government to keep the peace between individuals: no civilized life is possible unless injustice, vio-